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Abstract 
 
We investigate whether a departure from a tax-based accounting system toward the adoption 
of International Financial Reporting Standards encourages tax noncompliance.  We also 
examine whether such a departure, which weakens book-tax conformity, affects the 
informativeness of book-tax differences for tax noncompliance.  Our evidence suggests that 
as book-tax conformity decreases, tax noncompliance increases.  Although book-tax 
differences remain informative of tax noncompliance, the informativeness attenuates as 
book-tax conformity weakens.  Additionally, firms with high incentives to inflate book 
income are more tax compliant than their counterparts after the departure from a tax-based 
accounting system. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This study investigates the impact of a major change in an accounting system on tax 
noncompliance.  Specifically, many developed and developing countries use tax-based 
accounting systems, but some countries have recently changed their accounting systems to be 
more in line with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).1  This move is 
claimed to enhance the usefulness of financial reporting and gives corporate managers 
considerable discretion over the choice of accounting methods.  It also signals a major 
departure of financial reporting from tax reporting.  Based on the experience in China, we 
investigate whether this departure encourages tax noncompliance and whether after the 
departure we can still use book-tax differences as a red flag to signal tax noncompliance. 
 
 
1.1.  Studies on book-tax differences and changes in the book-tax relationship 
 
Book-tax differences can be due to differences between accounting standards and tax laws.  
They can also be the result of a firm's tradeoff between the tax incentive to lower taxable 
income and the financial reporting incentive to increase book income.  Some research 
suggests that large book-tax differences are positively associated with aggressive tax reporting 
(Desai, 2003; [Mills, 1996] and [Mills, 1998]).  Other research indicates that aggressive 
financial reporting contributes to large differences (Ayers et al., 2009; Hanlon, 2005; Lev and 
Nissim, 2004; Phillips et al., 2003; Seidman, 2008).  These studies examine the book-tax 
relationship in the US, where there are two separate sets of rules governing book and tax 
accounting and where the relationship between these two incomes has been generally stable 
over the years. 
 
Studies on the impact of a change in the book-tax relationship have found that increasing 
book-tax conformity causes firms to shift income for financial reporting purposes (Dhaliwal 
and Wang, 1992; Guenther et al., 1997).  However, it is not clear whether we can infer 
taxable income shifting from book income shifting (Hanlon, 2005).  Hanlon et al.  (2008) 
find that such an increase in book-tax conformity also reduces the informativeness of earnings 
in the US.  These studies focus on examining the impact on financial reporting quality of a 
change in the tax law that strengthens book-tax conformity. 
 
In this study, we examine whether changes in a financial reporting regime that weaken 
book-tax conformity encourage tax noncompliance.  We take advantage of a distinct set of 
Chinese listed companies that experienced such changes to examine this issue.  Before 1998, 
the accounting system in China was closely linked to tax assessment.  In a tax-based 
accounting system where book income and taxable income conform, financial reporting costs 
directly mitigate corporate incentives to avoid tax, and tax authorities are likely to treat any 
significant shortage of taxable income below book income as tax noncompliance.  After 
1998, China gradually relaxed the close link between tax and book income by allowing firms 
to make entries in their books of accounts that differ from the tax rules.  When book income 
is detached from taxable income, corporate incentives to engage in tax noncompliance will be 
much less constrained by financial reporting costs.  Therefore, we hypothesize that as 
book-tax conformity decreases, tax noncompliance will increase. 
 
When the two incomes are detached, book-tax differences can arise due to (1) legitimate 
differences in accounting standards versus tax rules, (2) managers exercising discretion in 
financial reporting to overstate book income and (3) managers taking advantage of the 
ambiguity in tax rules to understate taxable income.  Because book-tax differences come 
                                                      
1
 Brazil, China, France, Germany, India, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Vietnam and Eastern European countries have been among those with heavy 
tax influence on their national accounting systems (e.g., Street, 2002). However, there has been a trend toward a more independent 
relationship between accounting and taxation. For example, in line with international practice, Vietnam switched from a tax-based focus to an 
accrual-based accounting system in 2002 (Ernst and Young, 2002). Since 2005, France and Germany have adopted IFRS for listed companies 
(Radebaugh et al., 2006, 68, 71). More recently, Russia modified its accounting system from being “high alignment” to “low alignment” 
(Goncharov and Zimmermann, 2006). China has also gradually moved away from a tax-based accounting system since 1998. 
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from a combination of these sources, which are difficult to separate, the use of these 
differences to draw inferences about tax aggressiveness could be unreliable (Seidman, 2008; 
Tang, 2006).  Thus, we hypothesize that as the level of book-tax conformity decreases, the 
informativeness of book-tax differences for a firm's tax aggressiveness will decrease. 
 
 
1.2.  Decomposing tax noncompliance 
 
To provide more insight into the type of noncompliance affected by changes in financial 
reporting, we decompose noncompliance into book-tax-conforming noncompliance 
(violations of both financial reporting and tax rules) and book-tax-difference noncompliance 
(violations of tax rules only).  Because the opportunities and incentives for each type of 
noncompliance are not homogeneous, this approach offers a better understanding of the 
relationship between book-tax differences and tax aggressiveness than an examination of the 
aggregate noncompliance alone (Chan and Mo, 2002; Rhoades, 1999).  Our study provides 
robust archival evidence that legislative changes, which reduce book-tax conformity are likely 
to result in less compliance with tax laws.  The effect is mainly on book-tax-difference 
noncompliance rather than book-tax-conforming noncompliance.  Our finding also suggests 
that the departure of financial reporting from tax reporting is likely to increase the complexity 
of book-tax differences, which in turn will reduce their informativeness for tax 
noncompliance.  That reduction is most apparent for book-tax-difference noncompliance.  
Nevertheless, book-tax differences remain informative of tax noncompliance even after the 
departure from tax-based accounting. 
 
 
1.3.  Contributions of this study 
 
Our study contributes to the line of research that examines book-tax tradeoffs (e.g., Erickson 
et al., 2004; Hanlon et al., 2008; Mills, 1998).  In particular, Mills (1998) finds a positive 
relation between tax audit adjustments and book-tax differences in the US.  Our parallel 
finding suggests that Mills’ results are not country specific and can be generalized to different 
institutional settings.   Thus, our study validates the robustness of the book-tax tradeoff 
theory in a significant way, as our setting of a departure from a tax-based accounting system is 
pertinent to transition economies.  Moreover, we extend Mills’ research by examining how 
the relationship between tax audit adjustments and book-tax differences alters when 
regulatory changes cause a reduction in book-tax conformity.  We find a decrease in the 
strength of this relationship as book-tax conformity decreases.  We also find that book-tax 
differences are less informative about tax noncompliance for high book incentive firms (such 
as rights offering firms) than their counterparts after the departure from tax-based accounting. 
 
Our research is also timely in light of the recent policy debate in the US on the perceived 
costs and benefits of making the two income measures conform.  While some studies 
suggest that conforming book and tax rules decreases the information content of accounting 
information, others argue that in addition to lowering record-keeping costs, book-tax 
conformity would mitigate corporate incentives to engage in aggressive tax reporting.  
Although there is evidence that this conformity would weaken the information content of 
financial reporting (and thus reduce earnings quality) (Hanlon, 2005; Hanlon et al., 2008; Lev 
and Nissim, 2004; Phillips et al., 2003), the literature provides no evidence of the effect of 
conforming the two incomes on corporate tax noncompliance (Hanlon and Shevlin, 2005).  
Shevlin (2002) calls for more research to examine the consequences of book-tax conformity 
in those countries that closely align book and taxable income.  We provide direct evidence of 
the unfavorable tax-compliance consequences of switching the reporting regime from high to 
low book-tax conformity in China.  The debate in the US focuses on whether book and 
taxable incomes should conform more.  Indeed, one of the alternatives considered by the 
President's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform is taxing book income (Hanlon et al., 2008; 
McClelland and Mills, 2007).  We inform this debate by providing evidence of how a change 
in book-tax conformity affects corporate tax reporting behavior. 
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As many countries are moving away from tax-based accounting systems toward IFRS, our 
results serve as a useful reference for them in formulating their accounting and taxation 
policies.  In particular, these countries should consider increasing their tax enforcement 
efforts, including education on taxpayer accountability in anticipation of an increased amount 
of tax noncompliance (Sanders et al., 2008).  For countries that are not using tax-based 
accounting such as the US, if the adoption of IFRS results in less conformity than the current 
system (e.g., the removal of the link between book and tax accounting on LIFO as IFRS does 
not allow the use of LIFO), then we might similarly predict firms to be less compliant with 
the tax law.2 This implication suggests that even those countries that are used to dealing with 
nonconforming systems should maintain vigilance and adopt book-tax reconciliation 
requirements, similar to Schedule M-3 used in the US for public firms, to disclose more 
information on the sources and the magnitude of significant book-tax differences (Boynton 
and Mills, 2004). 
 
In the next section, we describe the evolution of the relationship between financial reporting 
and taxation in China.  We then develop the research hypotheses and describe the research 
design in 3 and 4, respectively.  We present the primary univariate and multivariate empirical 
results in Section 5 and draw our conclusions in Section 6. 
 
 
2. Institutional background 
 
2.1.  Changes in the level of book-tax conformity in China 
 
The traditional accounting system in China was directly linked to the fiscal budget and tax 
assessment.  Before 1978, there were no personal or enterprise income taxes, and thus no tax 
policy.  In 1979, the government introduced the profit-retention system, under which 
state-owned enterprises could retain a portion of their profits.  In 1983, the government 
replaced that system with a tax-remittance system that required all state-owned enterprises to 
pay a progressive income tax.  In 1994, the government launched a comprehensive tax 
reform that required all domestic enterprises to pay income tax at a flat rate of 33%.  In 
March 2007, China leveled the playing field for domestic and foreign companies by 
equalizing the rate to 25%, effective January 1, 2008. 
 
Since the government first implemented the tax system in 1983, tax laws have played a 
significant role in firms’ financial reporting activities.  The rules for measuring accounting 
profits were essentially the same as those for measuring taxable profits.  Therefore, it is not 
surprising that the Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises that was issued in 1992 
lacked many important qualitative characteristics of financial reporting that are typically 
found in Western countries (Davidson et al., 1996).  Over the years, significant changes in 
the socioeconomic environment in China have triggered a diversification in the objectives of 
financial reporting.  For example, the establishment of foreign investment enterprises has 
brought in foreign investors.  The privatization of state-owned enterprises has introduced 
domestic and foreign shareholders and creditors.  Unlike the government, the new users of 
financial statements are concerned about whether any bias in financial reporting (e.g., tax 
consideration) hinders sound business decisions.  For example, before 1998, government 
regulations set limits for bad debt provisions, controlled the selection of depreciation methods 
and the estimation of the residual value and useful life of fixed assets.  These tax-driven 
accounting provisions are incapable of truly reflecting a firm's financial position and 
operating results.  Such problems are especially serious given the relatively few alternative 
sources of information that analysts and investors can rely on in China's capital market. 
 
                                                      
2
 The US Congress is considering repealing LIFO for tax purposes (Hamilton, 2009). Our prediction that US firms 
will become less compliant is based on the assumption that LIFO remains a permissible tax accounting method 
in the US, or that the original LIFO firms may choose different methods for tax and financial reporting in the 
future. 
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Domestic and international pressures have hastened changes in the book-tax relationship in 
China.  In 1998, the Chinese government implemented a set of detailed operational 
accounting standards, Accounting Regulation for Listed Companies, that formally recognized 
for the first time that the objectives of financial reporting were different from those of tax 
reporting and that there was a need to relax the tax-based accounting principle.  The 1998 
Regulation permitted greater managerial discretion in financial accounting by removing many 
government controls.  For example, it removed the rigid limits on firms’ bad debt provisions, 
granted firms freedom to determine the useful life of assets and choose depreciation methods 
for financial reporting that are different from those under the tax law, and allowed a departure 
from historical cost for several asset classes for purposes of financial reporting.  With this 
increased discretion, Chinese managers had incentives to use different methods for financial 
and tax reporting as elaborated later.  Thus, the gap between the two forms of reporting 
began to widen. 
 
In preparing to meet its World Trade Organization commitment to accelerate the international 
accounting harmonization process, the Chinese government revised the Accounting Standards 
for Business Enterprises, effective from 2001.  The 2001 Standards marked a further 
departure from a tax-based accounting system.  For example, it no longer considered the 
government to be the most important information user (Xiao et al., 2004).  The Standards 
also expanded the application of the conservatism principle beyond that outlined in the 1998 
Regulation.  Most significantly, it reinforced a change in the management mindset about 
financial and tax reporting, allowing firms to legitimately maintain two sets of books and 
determine separate incomes for financial and tax reporting purposes. 
 
 
2.2.  Book-tax differences before and after the departure 
  
As discussed above, financial reporting in China has evolved through stages since the late 
1990s.  In comparison, there has been little change in tax legislation since 1994.  The move 
of financial reporting toward IFRS could lead to more aggressive earnings and tax 
management as public firm managers have dual incentives in reporting high book income and 
low tax income. 
 
During the book-tax conformity period, Chinese managers were supposed to use the same 
accounting methods for book and tax purposes, except for legitimate differences such as 
interest income from government bonds, which are not taxable but are recognized as income 
on the book.  Therefore, managers did not blatantly use different methods for book and tax 
reporting to evade taxes.  However, while the variety of book-tax differences in the 
high-conformity period was much smaller than that in the later periods, some still led to tax 
audit adjustments.  Misunderstanding of, or grey areas in, the tax law often caused these 
cases.  One example is government subsidies.  To protect the public against rising inflation, 
the Chinese government controlled retail prices of many daily necessities, such as gasoline, 
utilities and basic foodstuffs.  In return, the government paid discretionary subsidies to the 
affected companies from time to time to compensate for losses due to the price controls.  
Those companies reported these subsidies as book income, which was generally taxable with 
many exceptions, depending on the size and nature of the subsidies.  As the qualifying 
criteria for tax exemption varied from time to time and were often unclear, many managers 
deliberately failed to report some subsidies as taxable income when they should have.  
Another example is accrued interest, which should be reported as both book and taxable 
income.  Some managers did not report accrued interest for tax purposes on the grounds that 
they had received no cash to pay the tax. 
 
When the book-tax reporting rules diverged after 1998, Chinese managers were in a better 
position to plan complicated tax avoidance activities with little effect on financial reporting.  
Because the new reporting rule permits flexibility in selecting accounting methods and allows 
managers to make book entries that are different from the requirement of the tax rules, 
managers could deliberately make an entry in one set of books but not the other, or make 
different entries in each set using dissimilar revenue and expense recognition criteria. 
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The Appendix provides examples of common accounting items with book-tax differences 
before and after the departure from tax-based accounting.  These are legitimate book-tax 
differences according to the relevant accounting and tax regulations during our sample period.  
However, these accounting items could result in tax audit adjustments if firms violate the 
relevant tax regulations. 
 
 
2.3.  Tax audits and audit adjustments 
 
In China, the calendar year is used for both financial and tax reporting purposes.  During our 
sample period, Chinese listed companies had to file their annual income tax returns and their 
financial statements with the local tax authorities within 45 days from the year end.  The tax 
return begins with gross revenue, followed by deductible expenses, and then by adjustments 
to compute taxable income.  In the adjustment section, companies have to disclose book-tax 
reconciling items. 
 
Like many other jurisdictions, China's tax system works on self-assessment, which 
necessarily requires the tax authorities to carry out post-assessment field audits to verify 
compliance.  Although the government has pursued tax evaders for years, the focus in the 
past appears to have been on foreign companies, and recently on the personal income tax of 
wealthy domestic individuals.  There has been no similar nationwide campaign targeting 
Chinese listed companies, although similar to other businesses of economic significance, 
these listed companies are subject to periodic audits.  There was no reported change to the 
audit procedures or audit rates for listed companies over the study period according to the Tax 
Yearbook of China published by the State Administration of Taxation (SAT, 1996–2004).  
Although tax auditors’ expertise should improve over time, business and reporting 
complexities should also increase, thus leaving audit effectiveness essentially constant across 
the years. 
 
Starting in 1995, the Chinese tax authorities began to consider firm characteristics when 
identifying the audit sample.  For example, firms that report drastic changes in earnings and 
low profit margins (relative to the industry average) are more likely to come under scrutiny 
(SAT, 1997).  Tax auditors usually start the audit by examining the tax returns and book-tax 
reconciliation schedules.  They frequently focus on transactions that generate large book-tax 
differences, and follow up on exceptional variances between the two measures of income in 
the field audit.  They also pay attention to taxpayers whose tax payable is incompatible with 
firm size (SAT, 1997).  However, for cases with special complexities, such as transfer pricing 
manipulations, tax auditors will transfer these cases to a special audit department.  Thus, 
similar to [Chan and Mo, 2000] and [Chan and Mo, 2002], this study excludes transfer pricing 
adjustments.  Tax auditors finish the audit process by preparing a report that details every 
individual adjustment, including the type of account involved, the amount of adjustment 
proposed, reasons for the adjustment, and the effect of the adjustment on taxable income (SAT, 
1995). 
 
We measure tax noncompliance as the magnitude of the tax audit adjustment required by the 
tax authorities ( [Chan and Mo, 2000] and [Chan and Mo, 2002]; Chan et al., 2006b; Hanlon 
et al., 2007; Mills, 1998).  Although taxpayers can in theory appeal the decisions of the 
Chinese tax bureaus, few have done so in practice (Chan and Mo, 2002; Chan et al., 2006b).  
Following Chan and Mo (2002), we divide tax audit adjustments into book-tax-conforming 
adjustments and book-tax-difference adjustments.  Book-tax-conforming adjustments refer 
to those made to correct misstatements arising from violations of both financial and tax 
reporting regulations; they affect both book income and taxable income.  Examples include 
understating sales revenue and overstating cost of sales.  Firms have to increase their book 
income for this kind of adjustment (SAT, 1993).  Book-tax-difference adjustments relate to 
errors or irregularities arising from differences in financial reporting and tax regulations, and 
affect taxable income only.  Items that frequently require book-tax-difference adjustments 
include omitted taxable revenues already reported on the book, claiming expenses that are 
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non-deductible, and claiming expenses exceeding allowable limits. 
 
 
3. Research hypotheses 
 
Based on the foregoing discussion, we develop two sets of hypotheses about the impact of 
changes in book-tax conformity on tax noncompliance. 
 
 
3.1.  Level of book-tax conformity and tax noncompliance 
 
When accounting and tax regulations were largely aligned in China before 1998, corporate 
managers had to report conforming book income in most aspects.  This limited the extent to 
which firms could reduce taxable income while raising book income.  Taxable income 
significantly lower than book income readily signals tax noncompliance, making firms less 
likely to report significant book-tax differences.  If public firm managers lower taxable 
income and book income by a similar amount (i.e. book-tax-conforming noncompliance), 
they can incur high contracting and capital market costs, as reporting lower levels of book 
income has a negative effect on debt covenants and share price.  In such circumstances, 
managers have to balance the value of the expected tax savings with the associated non-tax 
costs. 
 
When the two sets of reporting rules were delinked, partially in 1998 and more completely in 
2001 in China, recognition criteria for tax and financial reporting purposes diverged, giving 
managers more leeway to lower taxable income in ways that did not necessarily lower book 
income in a conforming manner.3 In other words, managers now have more opportunities for 
tax noncompliance. 
 
While managers who report conformity to minimize tax costs face non-tax reporting costs, 
they no longer face the same costs when they do not have to report conforming book income.  
This suggests that regimes that allow the dual reporting of income will be likely to induce 
firms to have more book-tax-difference noncompliance, i.e., to take a more aggressive tax 
position with little or no effect on book income.  For book-tax-conforming noncompliance, 
managers will face a tax versus non-tax cost tradeoff similar to what they encountered in the 
high book-tax conformity period.  Because the incentive for conforming noncompliance has 
not changed since the departure from tax-based accounting, we expect no significant change 
in this type of noncompliance.  Hence, we formulate our first composite hypothesis as 
follows. 
 
H1.  The magnitude of firms’ tax noncompliance increases as book-tax reporting conformity 
decreases.  Specifically, the magnitude of book-tax-difference noncompliance in a low 
book-tax conformity period is greater than that in a moderate book-tax conformity period, 
which in turn is greater than that in a high book-tax conformity period.  In contrast, the 
magnitude of book-tax-conforming noncompliance does not differ significantly among the 
three periods. 
 
Some studies have found that in low book-tax conformity regime such as the US, large 
book-tax differences are the result of aggressive financial reporting (Ayers et al., 2009; [Desai 
and Dharmapala, 2006] and [Desai and Dharmapala, 2009]; Hanlon, 2005).  Thus, it is not 
certain that large book-tax differences in the book-tax delinked period will necessarily mean 
an increase in tax noncompliance.  Whether managers actually behave as hypothesized is the 
purpose of our empirical test.  As far as we can determine, we are the first to provide such 
                                                      
3
 Recent high-profile cases in the US have demonstrated the ability of some large public firms to structure 
transactions that reduce the amount of taxes paid, without reporting any corresponding decrease in pretax 
book income. For example, Enron was able to report its taxable income over the years 1996–1999 at US$5.8 
billion below its financial reporting income (Seida, 2003). 
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evidence on corporate tax compliance.  It is also possible that after the departure, firms will 
have less need to engage in book-tax-conforming noncompliance because they will have more 
leeway and lower non-tax costs to engage in book-tax-difference noncompliance.  Whether 
this is the case is also an empirical question. 
 
 
3.2.  Informativeness of book-tax differences for tax noncompliance 
 
If the two sets of income measures conform, any unexplained difference between the two 
incomes is a potential indicator of tax noncompliance.  However, if the two income measures 
are detached, allowing firms to report book and taxable incomes separately, then the gap 
between the two could become large.  The sources of this gap include identifiable 
differences due to the specific method required by each regulation, as well as differences due 
to managers exploiting nonconforming rules to simultaneously manage book income upward 
and taxable income downward.  Hence, it can be quite unreliable if tax authorities use 
book-tax differences to inform tax evasion in this situation (Seidman, 2008).  To summarize, 
as book-tax conformity decreases bringing more “noise” into book-tax differences, we expect 
these differences to become less indicative of a firm's book-tax-difference noncompliance.  
However, as book-tax-conforming noncompliance typically reduces book and taxable 
incomes by a similar amount, we expect that a change in book-tax differences will have no 
significant impact on this type of noncompliance.  Accordingly, we establish our second 
composite hypothesis as follows. 
 
H2.  The informativeness of book-tax differences for tax noncompliance decreases as 
book-tax reporting conformity decreases.  Specifically, book-tax-difference noncompliance 
is less sensitive to book-tax differences in a low book-tax conformity period than in a 
moderate book-tax conformity period, which in turn is less sensitive than in a high book-tax 
conformity period.  In contrast, book-tax-conforming noncompliance is not sensitive to 
book-tax differences in all three periods. 
 
While it is reasonable to expect a decrease in the informativeness of book-tax differences for 
tax noncompliance as book-tax conformity decreases, this is by no means certain.  Some 
firms can become very aggressive in tax reporting when book and tax incomes are delinked.  
Thus, their tax noncompliance can account for the major portion of their book-tax differences.  
Therefore, whether the informativeness of those differences will decline over time and 
whether we can still use those differences to predict tax noncompliance after delinking are 
empirical research questions. 
 
 
4. Research design 
 
4.1.  Sample selection and data 
 
Our sample includes non-financial firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchanges during 1996–2003.  We chose this period to cover the years both before and after 
the delinking of financial reporting from tax rules.  This is also a period when the 1994 tax 
reform (a major reform) was in full effect and during which no additional tax reform took 
place.  We obtained archival data on firm-level taxable income and tax audit adjustments 
from the Chinese tax authorities.  Tax officials randomly selected the cases from their annual 
tax audit database.  Acquiring taxable income from the tax returns minimizes measurement 
errors arising from the estimate of taxable income from tax expense and thus increases the 
power of our statistical tests (Hanlon, 2003; Mills and Plesko, 2003).  We collected the book 
income and other financial information about the sample firms from the China Stock Market 
and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database.  In China, both the separate and the 
consolidated entities use the same set of accounting standards. 
 
We began with 3647 firm-years with both complete audit and financial statement data 
available from 1996 through 2003.  Consistent with Mills (1998) and as explained in the 
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robustness test section, we excluded 485 firm-years with negative or zero book-tax 
differences (13% of the sample).  This process screened out 458 firm-years reporting a loss.  
We also excluded 172 firm-years with negative or zero audit adjustments (5% of the sample) 
to obtain more generalizable results (Mills, 1998).  We dealt with these exclusions in our 
sensitivity tests reported in the robustness test section.  Finally, we trimmed off 49 
firm-years identified as outliers with standardized residuals for audit adjustments exceeding 
three standard deviations in absolute value.  Thus, our pooled, cross-sectional sample for the 
main regression consists of 2941 firm-year observations.  The majority of the sample firms 
operate in the manufacturing industry (53%), followed by wholesale and retail trades (11%), 
conglomerates (10%), information technology (6%), real estate (5%) and utilities (4%). 
 
 
4.2.  Specification of the regression model 
 
To test our hypotheses, we draw on Mills (1998) to develop the following OLS regression 
models (firm and time subscripts are suppressed for simplicity) 
 
ADJ= α 0+ α 1BTD+ α 2PARTIAL_DELINK+ α 3DELINK+ α 4BTD × PARTIAL_DELINK+ α 5BTD ×
DELINK+α6RIGHTS+α7BTD×RIGHTS+α8OWNER+α9AGE+α10LOSS+α11SIZE+α12B_SHARE+
α13LEVERAGE+αkINDUSTRY+ε 
 
(1) 
BTD_ADJ=β0+β1BTD+β2PARTIAL_DELINK+β3DELINK+β4BTD×PARTIAL_DELINK+β5BTD×
DELINK+β6RIGHTS+β7BTD×RIGHTS+β8OWNER+β9AGE+β10LOSS+β11SIZE+β12B_SHARE+
β13LEVERAGE+βkINDUSTRY+ε 
 
(2) 
BTC_ADJ=γ0+γ1BTD+γ2PARTIAL_DELINK+γ3DELINK+γ4BTD×PARTIAL_DELINK+γ5BTD×
DELINK+γ6RIGHTS+γ7BTD×RIGHTS+γ8OWNER+γ9AGE+γ10LOSS+γ11SIZE+γ12B_SHARE+γ
13LEVERAGE+γkINDUSTRY+ε 
 
(3) 
 
where ADJ is the total tax audit adjustments deflated by sales revenue; BTD_ADJ the 
book-tax-difference audit adjustments deflated by sales revenue; BTC_ADJ the 
book-tax-conforming audit adjustments deflated by sales revenue; BTD the book-tax 
difference, which equals pretax book income minus taxable income deflated by sales revenue; 
PARTIAL_DELINK 1 if audit adjustments were made to a firm's taxable income during 
1998–2000 (i.e., the moderate book-tax conformity period), 0 otherwise; DELINK 1 if audit 
adjustments were made to a firm's taxable income during 2001–2003 (i.e., the low book-tax 
conformity period), 0 otherwise; RIGHTS 1 if the firm applied for a rights issue in one of the 
next 3 years, 0 otherwise; OWNER the percentage of shares owned by the government; AGE 
the number of years the firm has been listed; LOSS 1 if the firm reported a loss, 0 otherwise; 
SIZE the natural logarithm of total assets of the firm; B_SHARE 1 if the firm issued B shares, 
0 otherwise; LEVERAGE the debt to equity ratio of the firm and INDUSTRY the industry 
dummies (a set of eleven dummy variables). 
 
Audit adjustments are tax deficiencies detected by the Chinese tax bureaus after a tax audit.  
We deflate both the total tax audit adjustment (ADJ) and book-tax differences (BTD) by sales 
revenue (before tax audit) because most of the adjustments and book-tax differences concern 
revenues and expenses that are related to the level of a firm's activity.  The deflation also 
allows for cross-sectional comparison and reduces heteroskedasticity in the data.  Consistent 
with previous studies, we expect BTD to be positively associated with ADJ.  The coefficient 
α1 reflects the strength of BTD for ADJ in the pre-1998 period (i.e., the high book-tax 
conformity period).  If the magnitude of firms’ tax noncompliance increases as book-tax 
conformity decreases, then the signs on PARTIAL_DELINK (the moderate book-tax 
conformity period) and DELINK (the low book-tax conformity period) will be positive, and 
the coefficient for DELINK will be greater than that for PARTIAL_DELINK (i.e., α3>α2>0).  
As Hypothesis 1 also expects that the magnitude of book-tax-difference noncompliance 
(BTD_ADJ) will increase as book-tax conformity decreases, the signs of β1, β2 and β3 should 
be similar to those of α1, α2 and α3.  In contrast, we expect no significant change in the 
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magnitude of book-tax-conforming noncompliance (BTC_ADJ) over the three periods (i.e., 
γ2=γ3=0). 
 
We test Hypothesis 2 through the two interaction terms, BTD×PARTIAL_DELINK and 
BTD×DELINK.  The coefficients α4 and α5, respectively, measure the sensitivity of tax 
audit adjustments to changes in BTD in the moderate and the low book-tax conformity period 
as compared to the high-conformity period.  Specifically, as we argue that BTD is a less 
informative indicator of firms’ tax noncompliance (ADJ) when the level of book-tax 
conformity decreases, we expect α1>(α1+α4)>(α1+α5) and hence the signs of α4 and α5 to be 
negative.  Further, we expect that the effect on the informativeness of BTD for tax 
noncompliance will be most apparent for book-tax-difference noncompliance (BTD_ADJ). 
 
 
4.3.  Control variables 
 
We include nine control variables in the model.  After going public, Chinese listed firms can 
issue additional shares to their existing shareholders through rights offerings.  To curb 
excessive demand for rights offerings, the China Securities Regulatory Commission issued 
accounting-based guidelines to restrict rights issues after November 1993.  In general, the 
guidelines require Chinese listed companies to achieve a certain profitability level over the 3 
years immediately preceding the year of application for a rights offering.4 This requirement 
has led to rampant upward earnings management in China (Chen and Yuan, 2004).  To 
control for the special incentives to inflate book income, we use a dummy variable, RIGHTS, 
which takes on the value of 1 if the firm applies for a rights offering in one of the next 3 years.  
We predict that rights offering firms having high book incentives are less aggressive in tax 
reporting than their counterparts, because they will incur higher contracting and capital 
market costs by conforming book income to an aggressive tax position.5 Further, we include 
an interaction variable, BTD×RIGHTS, to assess whether book-tax differences are more or 
less informative for rights offering than non-rights offering firms. 
 
In China, government entities are the controlling shareholders of many listed companies.  
The tax incentives of government-controlled versus corporate-controlled firms vary.  For 
example, some managers of government-controlled firms view tax payment as part of their 
civil obligations.  However, most government-controlled firms also have important profit 
motives, as they need to meet investors’ expectations.  We include a continuous variable, 
OWNER, which is the percentage of shares owned by the government, to control for this 
possible effect.  Another ownership factor is the presence of foreign investors in Chinese 
listed companies, or B-Share firms (B_SHARE).  The presence of foreign investors brings in 
new management methods and better internal control systems that could reduce 
noncompliance (Chan et al., 2006a). 
 
Previous research has found conflicting evidence about the relationship between firm age and 
                                                      
4
 China's regulation stipulates that a firm can apply for a rights issue only if its return on equity (ROE) reaches a 
certain level in the 3 years immediately before the year of application. Over the years, the government has 
modified the regulation to close certain loopholes while at the same time lowering the threshold to 
compensate for the tightening of the rule. For example, the requirement in 1996 was a ROE≥10% in each of the 
3 previous years. In 1999, the regulation changed to require a 3-year average ROE≥10% and a ROE≥6% for each 
of the 3 previous years after listing. This requirement specifically excluded profits in the years before listing to 
discourage earnings manipulation before an IPO. Starting in 2001, the requirement was a 3-year average 
ROE≥6%. However, the 2001 regulation further tightened the requirement by excluding non-operating income 
in the calculation of ROE as many firms with a low operating ROE used non-operating income to increase their 
ROE to meet the requirement (Chen and Yuan, 2004). 
5
 We also consider two other variables that capture firms’ incentive to inflate book income. Firms with 2 years 
of consecutive losses as well as firms that issued corporate bonds have special incentives to inflate book income 
to avoid share delisting and violation of debt covenants, respectively. However, these variables are not 
significant due to the small sample size and multicollinearity problem. 
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financial distress.  Some researchers maintain that young firms are more likely to experience 
financial difficulties (Dopuch et al., 1987).  Others argue that older firms are more likely 
than younger firms to be susceptible to cash constraints over time after going public, and are 
less compliant with tax regulations (Murray, 1995).  To reflect these arguments, we employ a 
continuous variable, AGE, as a proxy for incentives to boost cash flows over time, but make 
no directional prediction regarding firm age because of the conflicting prior evidence.  Mills 
and Newberry (2001) suggest that loss firms have fewer tax-related incentives and thus tax 
authorities audit them much less frequently in the US.  However, Chinese tax authorities do 
audit loss firms.  In China, a loss firm must pay a tax penalty on any irregularity discovered.  
For example, if tax authorities discover an understatement of revenue, the firm must pay a 
33% tax penalty on the profit from the revenue understated, even though the firm is still in an 
overall loss position (SAT, 1996).  We employ a dummy variable, LOSS, to reflect this 
notion, but make no directional prediction on this variable. 
 
We use SIZE to control for any firm size and complexity effects.  Although Hanlon et al.  
(2007) find that firm size is positively associated with the level of tax noncompliance, Mills 
(1998) fails to find such an effect.  If large firms are more tax compliant because they are 
politically visible to the regulators, then the coefficient will be negative.  As the dependent 
variable is scaled by sales, we use total assets (natural log form) as the measure of SIZE to 
minimize the spurious bias to the estimated effect of scale that results from errors in 
measuring the true scale variable (Hanlon et al., 2007).  Further, we use LEVERAGE to 
measure a firm's leverage level.  Watts and Zimmerman (1986) suggest that firms subject to 
greater monitoring by lenders are more likely to use income-increasing accounting procedures 
to avoid violating debt covenants.  Therefore, the higher the leverage, the higher will be the 
non-tax cost of conforming book income to an aggressive tax position, and thus we expect a 
negative relationship between LEVERAGE and tax noncompliance.  INDUSTRY is a set of 
dummy variables for each industry classification and controls for the possibility that variation 
in industries is driving the audit adjustments. 
 
 
4.4.  Sample selection bias 
 
Because tax authorities do not audit every listed company, to the extent that audit adjustment 
is conditional on the tax return being selected for audit, the inference about the effect of 
book-tax differences on audit adjustment for the whole population could be biased.  To 
address the potential sample selection bias, we use the two-stage Heckman (1979) approach to 
first estimate the probability of a firm being selected for audit with a probit regression as 
follows. 
 
AUDIT= ∂ 0+ ∂ 1BTD+ ∂ 2BTD_IND+ ∂ 3OWNER+ ∂ 4AGE+ ∂ 5LOSS+ ∂ 6SIZE+ ∂ 7CHANGE+ ∂
8MARGIN_IND+∂9B_SHARE+∂10LEVERAGE+∂kINDUSTRY+μ 
(4) 
 
where AUDIT is 1 if the firm was selected for tax audit, 0 otherwise; BTD_IND the 
percentage of deviation of a firm's BTD from the industry average; CHANGE the percentage 
change in the firm's annual book income and MARGIN_IND the ratio of the firm's profit 
margin to the industry average.  Other variables are as defined earlier. 
 
We estimate Eq.  (4) for each of the three book-tax conformity periods.  The probit 
regression produces consistent estimates for ∂, and these estimates are used to compute the 
inverse Mills ratio, λ, for each period.  In the second stage, we use OLS to estimate Eqs.  
(1), (2) and (3) with the corresponding λ included as an additional variable to correct for 
potential bias due to sample non-representation.  Following the same sample selection 
criteria described earlier, we obtained from the Chinese tax authorities 1834 firm-years that 
were not subject to tax audits over the study period for probit regression analysis.  These 
firms had no audit adjustments. 
 
 
5. Empirical results 
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5.1.  Descriptive statistics and univariate tests 
 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the audited sample and univariate tests, comparing 
the means of the variables in Eqs.  (1), (2) and (3) over the three book-tax conformity levels.  
Mean total audit adjustments (ADJ), which is 0.32% of sales revenue in the high book-tax 
conformity period, increases to 0.49% in the moderate conformity period, and rises again to 
0.52% in the low-conformity period.  A similar pattern is observable for book-tax-difference 
audit adjustments (BTD_ADJ).  Mean book-tax differences (BTD) also show a similar trend, 
increasing from 5.09% of sales revenue in the high-conformity period to 18.8% in the 
low-conformity period.  It is interesting to note that while we observe a significant increase 
in BTD_ADJ over the three periods corresponding to the increase in BTD, there is no 
significant change in book-tax-conforming audit adjustments (BTC_ADJ). 
 
Table 1.  Descriptive statistics of the sample firms at different book-tax conformity levels. 
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Panel A: One-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the differences among the means 
  
Pooled 
(1996–
2003) 
(n=2941) 
High 
book-tax 
conformity 
(1996–
1997) 
(n=710) 
Moderate 
book-tax 
conformity 
(1998–
2000) 
(n=1286) 
Low 
book-tax 
conformity 
(2001–2003) 
(n=945) 
F-stat.  
(p-value) 
ADJ Mean 0.0046 0.0032 0.0049 0.0052 14.67 
 (St.  dev.) (0.0079) (0.0047) (0.0078) (0.0096) (0.000)a BTD_ADJ Mean 0.0039 0.0024 0.0043 0.0045 18.05 
 (St.  dev.) (0.0075) (0.0045) (0.0077) (0.0089) (0.000)a BTC_ADJ Mean 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0008 0.25 
 (St.  dev.) (0.0035) (0.0021) (0.0014) (0.0056) (0.783) BTD Mean 0.1222 0.0509 0.1134 0.1880 47.06 
 (St.  dev.) (0.2923) (0.0609) (0.1371) (0.4791) (0.000)a RIGHTS Mean 0.2618 0.3732 0.3390 0.0731 142.21 
 (St.  dev.) (0.4397) (0.4840) (0.4736) (0.2603) (0.000)a OWNER Mean 0.1866 0.2185 0.1872 0.1618 11.64 
 (St.  dev.) (0.2372) (0.2500) (0.2359) (0.2263) (0.000)a AGE Mean 4.6970 2.1944 4.2519 7.1831 1357.17 
 (St.  dev.) (2.7325) (1.7740) (2.0075) (2.0588) (0.000)a LOSS Mean 0.0584 0.0423 0.3578 0.1016 24.03 
 (St.  dev.) (0.2347) (0.2013) (0.1858) (0.3023) (0.000)a SIZE Mean 11.6014 11.2087 11.6061 11.8866 145.11 
 (St.  dev.) (0.8680) (0.8641) (0.8023) (0.8462) (0.000)a B_SHARE Mean 0.0806 0.0986 0.0793 0.0794 1.31 
 (St.  dev.) (0.2722) (0.2983) (0.2703) (0.2705) (0.273) LEVERAGE Mean 0.4388 0.4294 0.4209 0.4702 21.24 
 (St.  dev.) (0.1831) (0.1564) (0.1642) (0.2188) (0.000)a 
  
Panel B: Post hoc tests for the pairwise comparison of mean differences 
 High vs.  moderate High vs.  low Moderate vs.  low 
 Mean diff. p-value Mean diff. p-value Mean diff. p-value ADJ −0.0017 0.000a −0.0020 0.000a −0.0003 0.390 
BTD_ADJ −0.0019 0.000a −0.0021 0.000a −0.0001 0.739 
BTC_ADJ −0.0001 0.858 −0.0001 0.727 −0.0000 0.782 
BTD −0.0625 0.000a −0.1371 0.000a −0.0746 0.000a 
 
Notes: ADJ is total tax audit adjustment deflated by sales revenue.  BTD_ADJ is book-tax-difference 
audit adjustment deflated by sales revenue.  BTC_ADJ is book-tax-conforming audit adjustment 
deflated by sales revenue.  BTD is pretax book income minus taxable income deflated by sales 
revenue.  RIGHTS is an indicator variable set equal to 1 if the firm applied for rights offerings in one 
of the next 3 years, and 0 otherwise.  OWNER is the percentage of shares owned by the 
government.  AGE is the number of years the firm has been listed in the market.  SIZE is the 
natural logarithm of the total assets of the firm.  B_share is an indicator variable set equal to 1 if 
the firm issued B-shares, and 0 otherwise.  leverage is the debt to equity ratio of the firm.  LOSS is 
an indicator variable set equal to 1 if the firm reported a loss, and 0 otherwise.  Panel A reports the 
means of all variables in the three book-tax conformity periods and the ANOVA on the differences 
among the means.  Panel B uses the least significant difference (LSD) test for the pairwise 
comparison of mean differences. 
 a Denotes significance at the 5% level. 
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The overall F-tests (reported in the last column of Panel A) on the test variables reject the null 
hypothesis of equal means at the 5% level, except for BTC_ADJ.  The multiple pairwise 
comparison tests in Panel B indicate that the magnitudes of ADJ and BTD_ADJ increase as 
book-tax conformity decreases.  However, the increase is not statistically significant from 
the moderate to the low-conformity period.  There is also no significant increase in 
BTC_ADJ over the three periods.  In contrast, the magnitudes of BTD are significantly 
different among the three periods. 
 
An analysis of book-tax differences and audit adjustments in each period indicates that there 
are clearly more sources of book-tax differences in the moderate and the low-conformity 
periods than in the high-conformity period.  Observed differences resulting in audit 
adjustments common for all three periods include government subsidies and interest income 
from government bonds, as explained earlier, as well as adjustments for expenses exceeding 
tax deductible limits.  The frequency of these audit adjustments increases as book and tax 
incomes are delinked.  These types of difference reflect a more extensive government 
participation in the economy as compared with a mature Western economy such as the US.  
In the later periods, more complicated book-tax differences are due to transactions being 
reported differently for book and tax purposes.  Examples include the use of different asset 
useful lives, different lease accounting methods, sales cutoffs and revenue recognition criteria.  
Most of the later period book-tax differences in our sample are similar to those found in US 
studies.  However, our data do not have the differences due to sophisticated transactions such 
as off-balance-sheet financing using special purpose entities and debt–equity hybrid 
instruments that Mills and Newberry (2005) mention. 
 
5.2.  Multivariate tests 
 
Table 2 shows the results of our stage-one estimation of the probit regression for each of the 
three conformity periods.  We find that BTD and the deviation of BTD from industry 
average (BTD_IND) are the dominating factors affecting the audit selection in the 
high-conformity period, but both become less statistically significant in the other two periods.  
Specifically, the coefficient of BTD decreases from the high-conformity period to the 
low-conformity period.  BTD_IND also has a similar decreasing trend.  This is consistent 
with our argument in Hypothesis 2 that BTD becomes less informative of tax noncompliance 
as book-tax conformity decreases.  In contrast, other firm characteristics such as listing 
history (AGE), profit margin relative to industry average (MARGIN_IND) and firm size 
(SIZE) become more significant in the moderate and low-conformity periods.  That is, in the 
low-conformity period, the tax authorities appear to have focused on larger and older firms 
because of their potential impact on tax revenue, and on lower margin profitable firms, but not 
necessarily on loss firms as the LOSS variable is not significant. 
 
Table 2.  Stage one: probit estimation of firms being selected for audit (N=4775). 
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Probit equation: 
AUDIT=∂0+∂1BTD+∂2BTD_IND+∂3OWNER+∂4AGE+∂5LOSS+∂6SIZE+∂7CHANGE+∂8MARGIN_IND+∂
9B_SHARE+∂10LEVERAGE+∂kINDUSTRY+μ 
 Expected High conformity Moderate conformity Low conformity 
 Sign Coeff. p>|z| Coeff. p>|z| Coeff. p>|z| Constant  1.3151 0.091 −1.6139 0.011 −3.6481 0.000 BTD + 6.5678 0.000 a 1.8915 0.000 a 0.0052 0.970 
BTD_IND + 2.1101 0.000 a 1.6776 0.001 a 0.2016 0.184 
OWNER ? 0.0281 0.885 −0.2744 0.052 −0.1859 0.208 
AGE ? −0.0252 0.378 0.2931 0.000 a 0.2593 0.000 a 
LOSS ? 0.5722 0.084 0.2638 0.243 0.1827 0.164 
SIZE + 0.0302 0.067 0.0297 0.244 0.0982 0.000a 
CHANGE + −0.0019 0.715 −0.0057 0.525 −0.0002 0.884 
MARGIN_IND − −0.0023 0.950 −0.0167 0.432 −0.0898 0.001a 
B_SHARE − −0.1442 0.341 −0.1417 0.324 −0.1945 0.138 
LEVERAGE ? 0.2448 0.446 −0.2166 0.364 0.0054 0.976 
INDUSTRY ? Included, but not reported for brevity 
% correctly 
classified  63.8% 61.5% 62.6% 
Notes: This table shows the results of the first-stage probit regression estimating the probability of a firm being 
selected for tax audit at the three conformity levels.  The dependent variable, AUDIT, is an indicator variable set 
equal to 1 if a firm is selected for tax audit, and 0 otherwise.  BTD_IND is the percentage deviation of the firm's 
book-tax difference from the industry mean.  CHANGE is the percentage change in firm's annual book income.  
MARGIN_IND is the ratio of the firm's profit margin to the industry average.  INDUSTRY is a set of eleven 
dummy variables representing different industries.  All other variables are defined in Table 1. 
a
 Denotes significance at the 5% level. 
 
 
Table 3 shows the stage-two estimation results of pooled, cross-sectional regressions.6 Panel 
A presents the results for total audit adjustments (ADJ), while Panels B and C, respectively, 
present the results for book-tax-difference audit adjustments (BTD_ADJ) and 
book-tax-conforming audit adjustments (BTC_ADJ).  All three models explain the 
cross-sectional variations in audit adjustments significantly.  It appears that λ contributes 
little to the explanatory power of the models. 
 
Table 3. Stage two: audit adjustment regressions (N=2941). 
  
                                                      
6
 To correct for heteroskedasticity, we estimated the errors using White's heteroskedasticity-consistent 
procedure. We found no heteroskedasticity in the data. We also used a random coefficient regression model 
that does not assume constant residuals and obtained similar results as our original OLS regression. Further, all 
variance inflation factors are small (below 5.135) and all of the correlations among the independent variables 
are below 0.728. These results indicate no significant multicollinearity problem. 
16 
 
 
ADJ=α0+α1BTD+α2PARTIAL_DELINK+α3DELINK+α4BTDxPARTIAL_DELINK+α5BTD×DELINK+α6
RIGHTS+α7BTD×RIGHTS+α8OWNER+α9AGE+α10LOSS+α11SIZE+α12B_SHARE+α13LEVERAGE+αk
INDUSTRY+ε 
 
Exp. (Panel A) ADJ (Panel B) BTD_ADJ 
(Panel C) 
BTC_ADJ 
 
Sign Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
Constant 
 
0.0318 0.000 0.0262 0.000 0.0102 0.000 
BTD + 0.0142 0.002a 0.0160 0.000a 0.0016 0.442 
PARTIAL_DELINK + 0.0027 0.000a 0.0029 0.000a 0.0003 0.110 
DELINK + 0.0039 0.000a 0.0035 0.000a 0.0004 0.101 
BTD×PARTIAL_DELINK − −0.0074 0.120 −0.0111 0.017a −0.0012 0.567 
BTD×DELINK − −0.0105 0.022a −0.0133 0.003a −0.0009 0.661 
RIGHTS − −0.0011 0.002a −0.0012 0.001a 0.0001 0.821 
BTD×RIGHTS − −0.0042 0.000a −0.0034 0.001a −0.0005 0.311 
OWNER ? 0.0014 0.016a 0.0012 0.041a 0.0005 0.083 
AGE ? −0.0001 0.397 0.0001 0.459 −0.0001 0.074 
LOSS ? −0.0001 0.826 −0.0002 0.766 0.0000 0.865 
SIZE − −0.0024 0.000a −0.0022 0.000a −0.0004 0.000a 
B_SHARE − 0.0005 0.337 0.0000 0.963 0.0001 0.686 
LEVERAGE − −0.0025 0.002a −0.0019 0.014a −0.0007 0.055 
Λ ? −0.0006 0.182 −0.0009 0.060 0.0001 0.690 
INDUSTRY ? Included, but not reported for brevity 
  
F=20.44 (p=0.000) F=17.46 (p=0.000) F=5.74 (p=0.000) 
  
Adj. R2=14.2% Adj. R2=12.3% Adj. R2=3.9% 
 
Notes: This table shows the stage-two estimation results of the impact of book-tax differences on tax 
noncompliance at the three conformity levels. The dependent variables are total audit adjustment (ADJ), 
book-tax-difference audit adjustment (BTD_ADJ) and book-tax-conforming audit adjustment (BTC_ADJ) as 
defined in Table 1. PARTIAL_DELINK is an indicator variable set equal to 1 if audit adjustments were made to 
a firm's taxable income during 1998–2000 (the moderate conformity period), and 0 otherwise. DELINK is an 
indicator variable set equal to 1 if audit adjustments were made to a firm's taxable income during 2001–2003 
(the low-conformity period), and 0 otherwise. λ is the inverse Mills ratio. All other variables are defined in 
Table 1. 
a
 Denotes significance at the 5% level. 
 
 
 
As expected in Hypothesis 1, PARTIAL_DELINK and DELINK are significant with a 
positive coefficient for both the ADJ and the BTD_ADJ models, which suggest that tax 
noncompliance in the moderate or low-conformity period is significantly larger than that in 
the high-conformity period. Furthermore, a Wald test indicates that the coefficient for 
DELINK is significantly larger (at the 5% level) than that for PARTIAL_DELINK, which 
suggests that the magnitude of tax noncompliance increases as book-tax conformity 
decreases. 
 
For the two conformity period interaction terms in the ADJ model (Panel A), the coefficient is 
negatively significant for BTD×DELINK, but is not significant for 
BTD×PARTIAL_DELINK. Thus, we have evidence that the informativeness of book-tax 
differences for tax noncompliance decreases significantly in the low book-tax conformity 
period. For the BTD_ADJ model (Panel B), the relationship between BTD and tax 
noncompliance is clearer. The coefficients on both interaction terms are significant at the 5% 
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level, and they are clearly more significant than the corresponding coefficients in Panel A. 
Moreover, the coefficient for BTD in Panel B, which is 0.0160 (β1) for the high-conformity 
period, decreases to 0.0049 (i.e., β1+β4) for the moderate conformity period, and declines 
again to 0.0027 (i.e., β1+β5) for the low-conformity period. The Wald tests on these 
coefficients show that β1>(β1+β4)>(β1+β5)>0. These results indicate that BTD has a 
significant impact on book-tax-difference noncompliance in all three periods, but the impact 
declines substantially in the lower conformity periods. 
 
Panel C presents a rather different pattern for book-tax-conforming noncompliance 
(BTC_ADJ). None of the test variables are statistically significant. It is noteworthy that in 
both the univariate and multivariate tests, BTC_ADJ does not change in any significant way 
over the three book-tax conformity periods. Hence, it is useful to separate 
book-tax-conforming noncompliance from book-tax-difference noncompliance as they do 
exhibit very different forms of behavior. This separation allows us to observe a clearer 
association between book-tax differences and tax noncompliance. These results also 
strengthen our argument that there is no time series effect (e.g., an increase in audit expertise 
or effort) on audit adjustment over the three time periods. If there was such an effect, we 
would have observed an increase in both types of audit adjustment. 
 
For the control variables, we find that rights offering firms have significantly less total audit 
adjustments and book-tax-difference audit adjustments than non-rights offering firms (Panels 
A and B). These results suggest that rights offering firms, because of their need to meet 
minimum profitability requirements and because they cannot costlessly increase book-tax 
differences, are less likely than their counterparts to be aggressive in both tax and financial 
reporting. This is consistent with Erickson et al. (2004) and Mills and Newberry (2001) that 
managers may be willing to forfeit tax dollars by increasing book income in ways that also 
increase taxable income. The coefficients of the interaction term, BTD×RIGHTS, in Panels A 
and B are negatively significant suggesting that book-tax differences are more informative of 
tax noncompliance for non-rights offering firms than for rights offering firms. As non-rights 
offering firms have less book incentives for earnings management than rights offering firms, 
our results are parallel with Mills (1998, Table 2) that book-tax differences are more 
informative of tax noncompliance for private firms than for public firms. Similar to the rights 
offering firms, highly geared firms are subject to a higher non-tax cost of understating book 
income, and thus they are less likely to be noncompliant by reporting both lower taxable 
income and lower book income. Further, we find that firms with higher percentages of state 
ownership are less compliant in the ADJ and the BTD_ADJ models. Relative to small firms, 
large firms are more tax compliant because of the political costs they face for noncompliance. 
It is also possible that large firms are better able to have their tax-avoiding strategies go 
undetected because they have more resources to do so (Mills, 1998). For sub-industry effects 
(not tabled), we find that companies in the manufacturing and real estate industries have more 
audit adjustments than companies in other industries. 
 
In summary, the magnitude of tax noncompliance increases as book-tax conformity decreases. 
While the association between tax audit adjustments and book-tax differences is significantly 
positive at all conformity levels, our results demonstrate that those differences become less 
informative of tax noncompliance as the link between book income and taxable income 
loosens. This suggests that the noise created by having more legitimate differences and 
earnings management in the moderate and the low-conformity periods dilutes the 
informativeness of book-tax differences for tax noncompliance. The declining importance of 
book-tax differences in the audit selection process as shown in Table 2 provides corroborating 
evidence for this finding. 
 
 
5.3. Robustness tests 
 
To check the robustness of the regression results, we performed the following sets of 
secondary tests. First, as a firm's use of aggressive tax position could affect both 
book-tax-difference and book-tax-conforming audit adjustments, our regression equations for 
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BTD_ADJ and BTC_ADJ could be interdependent. We reran the data using a system of 
equations approach, Seemingly Unrelated Regression, to account for any possible 
contemporaneous correlation in the error terms of the two equations. Our results indicate that 
there was no change in the significance of the test variables as shown in Table 3. 
 
Second, to reduce the potential understated standard errors in a pooled, cross-sectional 
regression, we ran by-period regressions for each of the three levels of book-tax conformity as 
presented in Table 4. For both the ADJ (Panel A) and the BTD_ADJ models (Panel B), the 
coefficients on BTD show a general declining trend. In addition, the significantly negative 
coefficients for BTD×RIGHTS in the low-conformity period suggests that book-tax 
differences are more informative of tax noncompliance for non-rights offering firms than 
rights offering firms, consistent with the overall results in Table 3. Further, it appears that the 
significantly negative coefficients on RIGHTS and LEVERAGE (Panels A and B) are most 
evident in the low-conformity period. This suggests that rights offering and highly leveraged 
firms have significantly less tax noncompliance than their counterparts in the low-conformity 
period due to higher non-tax costs. 
 
Table 4. Stage two: audit adjustment regressions at different book-tax conformity levels. 
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 Exp. sign High conformity Moderate conformity Low conformity 
  Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Panel A: ADJ 
Constant ? 0.0125 0.000 0.0395 0.000 0.0481 0.000 
BTD + 0.0146 0.000a 0.0070 0.000a 0.0033 0.000a 
RIGHTS − 0.0003 0.491 −0.0013 0.045a −0.0023 0.049a 
BTD×RIGHTS − −0.0089 0.124 −0.0069 0.060 −0.0030 0.031a 
OWNER ? 0.0009 0.238 0.0010 0.262 0.0025 0.059 
AGE ? −0.0000 0.883 0.0001 0.486 −0.0003 0.031a 
LOSS ? −0.0001 0.957 0.0001 0.954 0.0001 0.923 
SIZE − −0.0008 0.001a −0.0028 0.000a −0.0032 0.000a 
B_SHARE − 0.0002 0.750 0.0001 0.855 0.0007 0.565 
LEVERAGE − −0.0019 0.114 −0.0017 0.215 −0.0036 0.013a 
λ ? 0.0004 0.498 −0.0012 0.090 −0.0007 0.498 
INDUSTRY ? Included, but not reported for brevity 
  F=3.20 (p=0.000) F=11.49 (p=0.000) F=10.02 (p=0.000) 
  Adj. R2=6.1% Adj. R2=14.6% Adj. R2=16.7% Panel B: BTD_ADJ 
Constant ? 0.0130 0.000 0.0334 0.000 0.0375 0.000 
BTD + 0.0123 0.001a 0.0051 0.003a 0.0025 0.001a 
RIGHTS − −0.0002 0.605 −0.0014 0.027a −0.0022 0.050a 
BTD×RIGHTS − −0.0006 0.900 −0.0054 0.144 −0.0024 0.062 
OWNER ? 0.0001 0.884 0.0009 0.305 0.0024 0.056 
AGE ? 0.0003 0.007a 0.0002 0.215 −0.0002 0.132 
LOSS ? −0.0011 0.184 0.0001 0.981 0.0002 0.984 
SIZE − −0.0009 0.000a −0.0024 0.000a −0.0029 0.000a 
B_SHARE − 0.0002 0.721 0.0001 0.904 0.0002 0.868 
LEVERAGE − −0.0007 0.538 −0.0017 0.239 −0.0029 0.034a 
λ ? −0.0012 0.330 −0.0013 0.081 −0.0005 0.574 
INDUSTRY ? Included, but not reported for brevity 
  F=4.67 (p=0.000) F=8.87 (p=0.000) F=8.31 (p=0.000) 
  Adj. R2=9.8% Adj. R2=11.40% Adj. R2=13.4% Panel C: BTC_ADJ 
Constant ? 0.0062 0.000 0.0062 0.000 0.0213 0.000 
BTD + 0.0019 0.270 0.0002 0.580 0.0006 0.200 
RIGHTS − 0.0004 0.532 −0.0002 0.082 0.0001 0.928 
BTD×RIGHTS − −0.0009 0.959 0.0008 0.244 −0.0004 0.654 
OWNER ? 0.0003 0.421 −0.0001 0.563 0.0013 0.103 
AGE ? −0.0000 0.625 −0.0000 0.074 −0.0001 0.346 
LOSS ? −0.0002 0.561 0.0001 0.644 −0.0000 0.996 
SIZE − −0.0005 0.000a −0.0004 0.000a −0.0006 0.008a 
B_SHARE − −0.0001 0.802 0.0000 0.902 0.0003 0.690 
LEVERAGE − −0.0007 0.190 −0.0001 0.600 −0.0012 0.190 
λ ? 0.0003 0.568 0.0003 0.391 −0.0005 0.426 
INDUSTRY ? Included, but not reported for brevity 
  F=3.15 (p=0.000) F=5.52 (p=0.000) F=4.40 (p=0.000) 
  Adj. R2=6.0% Adj. R2=6.9% Adj. R2=7.0% 
Notes: All variables are as defined in Table 1 and Table 3. 
    
a 
Denotes significance at the 5% level. 
 
Third, we excluded 1998 and 2001 because they were transitional years during which China 
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implemented new accounting regulations. We also tested our results with another reduced 
population by treating the partial delinking period (1998–2000) as transitional and examined 
only the top (2001–2003) and the bottom (1996–1997) observations. Our main results are not 
sensitive to using these reduced populations. Fourth, we replicated Table 3 by scaling audit 
adjustments and BTD by total assets and using sales revenue as the measure of SIZE. The 
main results are invariant to using this alternative scaling. Fifth, we added back 172 
firm-years with negative or zero audit adjustments (about 5% of the sample) into our main 
sample. Replication of Table 3 indicates that our conclusions remain qualitatively the same as 
the original results. Sixth, we replicated the analysis reported in Table 3 for the sample with 
negative or zero book-tax differences (13% of the total sample distributed roughly equally 
over the three periods) and, in line with Mills (1998), we found no statistically significant 
relationship between BTD and the magnitude of audit adjustments. As Mills (1998) explained, 
negative book-tax differences are often the result of large, infrequent expenses that are not tax 
deductible and are thus unrelated to the magnitude of adjustments. 
 
Finally, we compared the audit adjustments across years within the same book-tax conformity 
period to ascertain whether there was any time series effect. Our multivariate results indicate 
that audit adjustments are not significantly different from year to year within each of the three 
periods, but they are different across different periods. These results provide assurance that 
changes in audit adjustments are mainly due to changes in the propensity of managers to 
engage in opportunistic reporting behavior. Corresponding to this finding, we also checked 
the within-firm changes in BTD for firms that had been audited across all the sample years 
(47 firms). We found that the changes in BTD within a period are significantly smaller than 
the changes across different periods.7 These results further strengthen our argument that 
changes in audit adjustments and book-tax differences are due mainly to changes in 
regulations rather than a time series effect. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Many countries are moving away from tax-based accounting systems in the hope of 
improving the usefulness and value relevance of financial reports. In this study, we investigate 
whether that move is likely to engender tax noncompliance and how well book-tax differences 
can continue to signal tax noncompliance. Aligning tax and book income will force firms to 
make the book-tax tradeoff, constraining the extent to which firms engage in tax 
noncompliance behavior. In contrast, detaching book income from taxable income will 
decrease the need for the tradeoff, thus creating more opportunities for firms to manage 
taxable income with less effect on book income. Furthermore, when book income conforms to 
taxable income, book-tax differences should generally be small, and any material shortage of 
taxable income below book income probably represents tax noncompliance. However, when 
book income departs from taxable income, book-tax differences are the result of intrinsic 
differences in the rules for financial reporting and tax reporting, and extrinsic differences in 
managerial intent. Thus, we expect that book-tax differences will be a less useful indicator of 
tax noncompliance when financial reporting is delinked from tax reporting. Based on a 
distinct set of listed firms that experienced a shift in the level of book-tax conformity in China, 
we provide evidence that as the level of book-tax conformity decreases, tax noncompliance 
increases and book-tax differences become less predictive of tax aggressiveness. 
 
Our study contributes to the book-tax tradeoff literature in a number of ways. First, we extend 
the applicability and validate the robustness of the book-tax tradeoff theory using a setting 
(departure from tax-based accounting) not available in the US but highly relevant for many 
                                                      
7
 While the average percentage changes in BTD within each of the three periods are 12% in the 
high-conformity period (1996–1997), 21% in the moderate-conformity period (1998–2000) and 65% in the 
low-conformity periods (2001–2003), the changes in BTD across different periods are 164% from the high to the 
moderate period (i.e., from 1997 to 1998) and 179% from the moderate to the low-conformity period (i.e., from 
2000 to 2001). 
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transition economies. Second, we empirically verify the impact of a change in the book-tax 
conformity level on the change in the magnitude of tax noncompliance and the type of 
noncompliance affected. Third, we enrich the book-tax tradeoff theory by linking the change 
in the need for a tradeoff with the change in the informativeness of book-tax differences for 
tax noncompliance, and the change in their importance for tax audit selection. Fourth, our 
study provides evidence of how firms with special incentives to inflate book earnings tradeoff 
current tax savings against financial reporting incentives and expected tax examination costs 
at three different book-tax conformity levels. 
 
Finally, the study sheds light on the recurring debate about the perceived benefits and costs of 
conforming book and taxable income. Previous studies have generally examined the costs of 
book-tax conformity for capital markets. The belief that this conformity would mitigate 
corporate tax avoidance is based largely on perception. Our study fills this gap in the literature 
by providing archival evidence that conforming book-tax incomes are indeed less costly from 
a tax perspective. Thus, our study provides support for the proponents of book-tax conformity 
in the US. Our results show that narrowing the book-tax difference gap can reduce the 
opportunities and incentives for tax noncompliance. 
 
Our findings also have public policy implications for other countries, especially transition 
economies contemplating a change in the book-tax relationship. One implication is that 
policymakers should consider not only the positive effect of relaxing tax-based accounting 
principles on the quality of financial reports, but also the negative impact of this relaxation on 
tax law compliance. Countries that decouple their financial and tax reporting systems should 
proactively increase their tax enforcement efforts. To facilitate tax enforcement, we 
recommend that listed firms be required to disclose more information about the sources and 
magnitude of significant book-tax differences in their tax returns. This disclosure requirement 
should improve the transparency of a firm's tax activities and provide up front, before an audit, 
an important source of supplemental information from which the government can then 
determine whether to pursue an audit. 
 
 
Appendix.  
 
See Table A1. 
 
Table A1. Common book-tax differences (BTD) per relevant accounting and tax regulations 
before and after the departure from tax-based accounting. 
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Accounting item Under tax-based accounting After adoption of IAS/IFRS 
 BTD Book-tax treatments BTD Book-tax treatments 
1. Useful life of fixed 
assets No 
Same useful lives for book 
and tax purposes. Yes 
Different useful lives for book and 
tax purposes (e.g., a longer useful 
life for book). 
2. Salvage value of 
fixed assets No 
Same salvage value (5% of 
original cost) for book and tax 
purposes. 
Yes 
Different salvage values for book 
and tax (e.g., 5% for tax, but more 
than 5% of the original cost for 
book). 
3. Depreciation 
method No 
Same method (usually 
straight line method, 
accelerated methods allowed 
for certain plant assets). 
Yes 
Different depreciation methods for 
book and tax purposes (e.g., 
straight line method for book, but 
accelerated method for tax for 
certain plant assets). 
4. Inventory 
valuation No 
Based on historical cost and 
the same inventory costing 
method for book and tax 
purposes. 
Yes 
Lower of cost or market for book 
only. Different inventory costing 
methods for book and tax 
purposes (e.g., FIFO for book and 
average method for tax). 
5. Bad debt 
provision No 
Provision ranges from 0.3% to 
0.5% of accounts receivable 
for book and tax purposes. 
Yes 
No restriction on provision for 
book, but up to 0.5% of accounts 
receivable balance for tax purpose. 
6. Intangible assets No 
Historical cost and amortize 
over the contract period or 10 
years (not more than 10 years 
for book, but at least 10 years 
for tax, thus in practice 10 
years). a 
Yes 
Revalue or amortize over not more 
than 10 years depending on asset 
useful life for book, but amortize 
over at least 10 years for tax 
purpose. 
7. Organization 
costs No 
Amortize over 5 years for 
book and tax purposes. Yes 
Amortize over not more than 5 
years for book, but at least 5 years 
for tax purposes.a 
8. Short-term and 
long-term 
investments 
No 
Historical cost and no 
unrealized gain/loss for book 
and tax purposes. 
Yes 
Lower of cost or market for book 
purpose and unrealized gain/loss 
recognized for book, but not for tax 
purpose. 
9. Interest income 
from government 
bonds 
Yes 
Interest income recognized 
for book but exempted for tax 
purpose. 
Yes Same as tax-based accounting. 
10. Revenue from 
transfer of 
technologies 
Yes Revenue recognized for book but exempted for tax purpose. Yes Same as tax-based accounting. 
11. Donations/ 
income received for 
environmental 
protection and 
charitable projects 
Yes 
Donations/income recognized 
as income for book purpose 
but exempted for tax purpose. 
Yes Same as tax-based accounting. 
12. Government 
subsidies Yes/No 
Subsidies recognized as 
income for book purpose but 
exempted for tax purpose if 
the subsidies relate to food, 
high-tech R&D and other 
allowed items as per relevant 
regulations. 
Yes/No 
Same as tax-based accounting. 
However, specific tax exemptions 
change over time. 
a
 The difference in accounting and tax regulations indicates that the Chinese tax authorities do recognize the 
potential of firms overstating book income and understating taxable income. 
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